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Abstract
We analyze the effect of multimarket contact on the pricing behavior of phar-
maceutical firms controlling for different levels of regulatory constraints using the
IMS MIDAS database for the industry. Theoretically, under product differentiation,
firms may find it profitable to allocate their market power among markets where
they are operating, specifically from more collusive to more competitive ones. We
present evidence for nine OECD countries suggesting the existence of a multimar-
ket effect for more market friendly countries (U.S. and Canada) and less regulated
ones (U.K., Germany, Netherlands), while the results are more unstable for highly
regulated countries with some countries being consistent with the theory (France)
while others contradicting it (Japan, Italy and Spain). A key result indicates that
in the latter countries, price constraints are so intense, that there is little room
for allocating market power. Thus equilibrium prices are expected in general to be
lower in regulated countries.
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1 Introduction
Multimarket competition is defined as “a situation where firms compete with each other
simultaneously in several markets” (Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985)). Scott (1982) noted
that the grouping of sellers in multiple markets may create interdependence among firms
in such a way that a desirable competitive process could be reduced tacitly or in a co-
ordinated way. Scott (1982) built on the old hypothesis of the existence of “spheres
of influence” by Edwards (1955). This observation proposed that firms that meet each
other in several markets may have incentives to relax competition because they will rec-
ognize the interest of its rivals on some markets (their spheres of influence) and they
will respect them in the expectation that their own interests will also remain unaffected.
The pharmaceutical industry is a paramount example of a multimarket contact structure
since several firms (particularly, large multinational corporations) coexist in a variety of
product markets, either defined in therapeutical or geographical terms. Typically large
pharmaceutical corporations serve a fraction of the markets, compete among themselves
and compete with other smaller firms, possibly local producers. Hence, in principle the
traditional view of multimarket contact that predicts higher prices in the overall industry
could be applied to the pharmaceutical sector. However more interesting and relevant
hypotheses can be tested from a more actual perspective.
In effect, in their seminal work Bernheim and Whinston (1990) presented a modern ap-
proach to formalize the expected effects of multimarket contacts and review the traditional
approach using dynamic games. The setting of their theoretical exercise is that of a re-
peated competition game with discounting where firms meet in an infinite time horizon.
Their relevant result for our purposes claims that under the presence of product differ-
entiation and preeminently differences in the degrees of product differentiation among
markets, the multiple market contact setting firms can find it optimal to allocate their
market power across markets [Bernheim and Whinston (1990, p.19)]. As opposed to the
traditional view, we may label this prediction as an strategic effect of the multimarket
contact structure of an industry. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) show that this result
is obtained by redistributing optimally collective market power in some markets to other
markets where collusion is difficult or not possible to sustain in isolation, i.e. not consider-
ing the multimarket nature of the industry. This result states that firms may strategically
give up profits -reduce prices- in markets where higher prices are easier to sustain1 in favor
of markets where collusion is difficult or less likely to arise, possibly because products are
closer substitutes. The result does not require full monopolization of some markets, in
fact full monopolization may not be sustainable in any market; the key is to recognize
that different degrees of collusion may be observed in different markets under product
differentiation. Given this result, multimarket contact collusion under product differenti-
ation may be welfare improving because it involves increasing prices in some markets but
reducing them in others2.
1Ease of collusion depends on a number of factors such as the number of firms operating in the market,
product homogeneity, speed of interaction, cost asymmetries, demand stability, etc.
2More recent theoretical developments includes Spagnolo (1999) and Matsushima (2001). The first
demonstrated that for specific concavity assumptions of the firms’ objective functions the traditional
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The pharmaceutical industry accounts for many interesting aspects such as different lev-
els of regulation across countries, product differentiation possibly both at the horizontal
and quality levels, different degrees of competition across product markets and other in-
stitutional arrangements affecting equilibrium prices 3. Differences in competitive levels
across product markets according to Bernheim and Whinston (1990) may foster the col-
lusive mechanism through multimarket contact. At the same time, differences among
firms and across markets in terms of the perceived quality of the product by doctors, for
instance, are also likely to enhance the multimarket contact mechanism to sustain collu-
sion. Therefore, it appears that this industry satisfy the conditions for a relevant study
of the effects of the external (to the individual market) multimarket industry structure
as a source of price variation as reported for the heterogenous product case in Bernheim
and Whinston (1990).
Although there have been serious empirical works that successfully test the traditional
prediction of the multimarket contact in different industries such as those by Evans and
Kessides (1994), Parker and Roller (1997), Jans and Rosembaum (1996) and Pilloff (1999),
Ferna´ndez and Mar´ın (1998) presented the first empirical assessment of the market power
allocation hypothesis. Their study focused in the Spanish Hotel industry, finding relevant
strategic market power allocation. We follow closely this work to implement the multi-
market theory for the pharmaceutical industry case, however we take advantage of the
different intensities of price regulation across OECD countries to study how the multi-
market structure interacts with this particular regulatory constraint. The relevance of
this analysis from a public policy point of view is out of question as we believe the de-
sign of price regulations barely takes into account how it may affect performance through
structural characteristics of the industry. Therefore our aim is twofold. First we test
whether optimal collusion through market power allocation can be inferred from product
level data by countries, and second we study the sensibility of the result to different levels
of price regulation.
The present work provides an empirical implementation of the multimarket theory for
the pharmaceutical industry for nine OECD countries. Given the existing institutional
differences in the pharmaceutical markets across countries the original contribution of this
paper is to test the theory in the context of price regulation variation. As an extension of
the results, we aim at evaluating empirically how more or less stringent price regulations
is likely to affect pricing decisions through the multimarket mechanism. As mentioned
in Puig-Junoy (2005), arguments regarding classic market imperfections in the pharma-
ceutical industry have been used by authorities to create drug price controls, however it
is well known that the main concern is the level of public expenditures in pharmaceuti-
cal products, specially for health systems financed through public sources as is the case
multimarket effect will appear even if no asymmetries across markets exists. The second showed that
an increasing number of multimarket contacts among competitors can solve the problem of imperfect
monitoring in sustaining more collusive equilibria
3Some theoretical works considering these aspects of the industry includes, Cabrales (2003),
Ko¨nigbauer (2006) Miraldo (2007) while empirical research has been conducted by Cleanthous (2004)
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of most EU experiences [See comments in Danzon (1999); Danzon and Chao (2000a,b);
Puig-Junoy (2004) and Miraldo (2007)]. Thus, many different types of price regulations
and other policies have been put forward by developed countries, and EU countries in
particular, to alleviate the incidence of drug prices over public health expenditures. Price
regulations usually do not pay attention to industry characteristics external to the market,
more specifically the whole industry structure. In the pharmaceutical industry at a na-
tional level, a salient feature is the coexistence of many corporations in different products
markets or business/product lines. Consequently, the relevant question is to investigate
whether strategic behavior driven by multimarket contacts is affected by the intensity of
price regulation with the ultimate objective of providing useful insights for policy evalu-
ation.
In the context of diverse regulatory regimes, Danzon and Chao (2000b) identified different
groups of countries depending on the intensity of regulation, including price regulation.
From more to less regulated, the first group includes France, Italy, Japan [and Spain
which was not used in Danzon and Chao (2000b)] where launch prices are regulated and
afterwards are revised downwards over the drug’s life cycle, and the price of new varieties
is related to the price of established varieties. In addition, generic substitution by phar-
macists is not allowed in France and Italy. Moreover, in the latter countries, pharmacies
are paid a margin on the product price which may encourage them to sell more expensive
products. The second group includes UK and Germany [and The Netherlands which also
was not used in Danzon and Chao (2000b)] were corporations are free to set prices at
launch but prices cannot increase later on. In addition, in both countries there is some
type of upper bound to prices, implemented either through a Reference Price (Germany)
or a maximum overall rate of return (UK). Consumer demand substitution is partially
possible only in Germany because of the possibility of multisource drugs. Generic substi-
tution by pharmacists is the main source of price-demand elasticity since they keep the
margin between the reimbursement price and the manufacturers price. This is possible in
UK, and to a lesser extent in Germany. In this second group we also include the Nether-
lands given its similarities with Germany in institutional terms [Danzon and Ketchman
(2003)]. The third group includes US and Canada where prices are relatively free, con-
sumers’ and physicians’ demands appear to be less inelastic and generic substitution on
the side of the pharmacists is encouraged as a mean to promote competition. Danzon and
Ketchman (2003) indicate that in the US the existing type of regulation is in fact a mild
Reference Price; in any case this country is taken as a benchmark for competition analysis.
Danzon and Chao (2000a,b) estimate reduced form equations for prices on quality at-
tributes and competition characteristics. According to their expectation, the competition
variables should be significant only in less regulated markets. The empirical results sug-
gests that regulation constraints competition.4 The main goal of our work can be seen as
4Regulation can have impact on other aspect of the market such as rate of launch of new products.
In this sense, Kyle (2007) examines the effect of price controls in the extent and timing of the launch of
new drugs around the world and finds that regulation has a statistically and quantitatively important
effect on pharmaceutical launches. Danzon et al. (2005) examine the effect of price regulation on delays
in launch of new drugs. They find that countries with lower expected prices or smaller expected market
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an extension of this type of analysis to account for the effects of multimarket contact on
competition in order to identify additional effects of regulation on competition.5
Apart from the institutional constraints for business practices, the industry presents sev-
eral particular characteristics that are worth noting. Previous evidence in this industry
(see Berndt et al. (1999); Berndt et al. (1996); Cockburn and Anis (1998); and Suslow
(1996)) suggest that marginal costs are almost irrelevant in the industry and recommend
the use of a hedonic price approach. Several authors have also accounted for perceived
quality when modeling the pharmaceutical industry, particularly from the likely effects
of advertising and promotion over price insensitiveness. In particular, King (2000) and
Windmeijer et al. (2004) conclude that brand advertising and promotion further reduces
price sensitiveness of drugs. In a somehow related work, Coscelli (2000) suggests that drug
consumption exhibits time dependence which implies additional price insensitiveness due
to what can be understood as brand loyalty.
With respect to the effects of entry of generic products on price evolution, the empir-
ical evidence is ambiguous. After entry of generic products, some authors (Grabowski
and Vernon, 1992 and 1997, and Caves, Whinston Hurwitz, Pakes and Termin, 1991)
report that brand-name prices increased relative to generic prices, while others (Wiggins
and Maness, 1994) find a reduction in prices following entry. Finally, Frank and Salkever
(1992 and 1997) report that brand name prices increased while generic products prices
fell, producing a reduction in average prices. The latter explain the correlation between
brand name prices and generics’ entry through a Stakelberg price leader model, where
brand name producers set prices for their products in the first stage and generic product
producers set prices only after observing brand name product prices. Demand is formed
by two segments: one is price insensitive and the second is price responsive. After the
entry of generics price responsive buyers shift to generics and brand name firms, who are
left with price insensitive consumers decide to raise their prices 6. We will differentiate
the effect of generic prices over the pricing decisions of firms considering that brand-name
drugs belong to a particular (though not independent) segment of the market.
The theoretical results about competition and multimarket contact can lead to several
types of tests and applications in the context of the pharmaceutical markets. As Evans
and Kessides (1994) suggest: ’In empirical tests of the multimarket contact hypotheses,
size have fewer launches and longer launch delays.
5Danzon and Furukawa (2003) suggest that fixed costs are distributed across countries depending
on demand elasticities, so that higher prices happen to be in richer countries. This suggest that in a
cross-country study specific country measures should also be included in the regression.
6However, this mixed evidence could also be interpreted in the context of more traditional models of
competition were we take into account the existence of multimarket contact and the interaction between
brand name and generic products markets. For instance, assume that ease of collusion was lower (for
whatever reason) in the brand name market while it is higher in the generic products market (for instance,
because of cost and brand image symmetry, that would make competition very tough in the absence of
some degree of tacit collusion). Now, in the presence of multimarket contact, if the same firms operate
in both markets, the emergence of the generic products market could induce an increase in brand-name
product prices, while being consistent with a lower average price in the market.
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appropriate definition of the market is of paramount importance.’ Pharmaceutical markets
are usually bounded in terms of therapeutic classes of drugs, the members of which often
are therapeutic substitutes, e.g., antiulcer drugs, antidepressants, anticholesterol drugs.
etc.7 In addition, within each therapeutic class we find a large number of countries which
might be regarded as independent markets on the demand side because of differences
in their regulatory systems and various barriers to the mobility of drugs. Then from a
geographical point of view, markets might be defined as countries and within countries a
market is to be regarded either as a product line or a grouping of related product lines.
We motivate the empirical exercise by showing that it is possible to formulate, within
a model with (symmetric) product differentiation, an expression for the observed prices
as the equilibrium strategies of an infinite horizon game with discounting which has three
separable parts: First, a function for the stage game price in equilibrium, Second, a func-
tion of the multimarket external conditions, and a function of the time preference. This
formulation is comparable to that followed in Ferna´ndez and Mar´ın (1998). For the em-
pirical test of multimarket contact effects, we use a multicountry and multiproduct data
set from the IMS MIDAS international dataset for the period 1998-2003. This dataset
encompasses a large number of countries including the top ten in terms of pharmaceutical
expenditures, as well as medium size and small countries. It also includes a large number
of groups or anatomic classifications, and allows to study between countries variations,
specially in terms of both regulatory regimes and industry structure. Provided with this
data set, we select a sample of nine OECD countries, namely U.S., Canada, U.K., Nether-
lands, Germany, France, Japan, Italy and Spain that differ mainly in the toughness of
pricing regulations but other institutional arrangements are comparable such as the com-
pulsory need of a prescription for drug delivery. We estimate the effect of multimarket
contact on prices using panel data methods which also helps us to control for a variety
of effects such as idiosyncratic corporation effects and where the case requires country
specific fixed effects.
Our results suggest a significant presence of the predictions of the multimarket theory
for more market friendly countries (U.S. and Canada) and less regulated ones (U.K.,
Germany, Netherlands), in contrast, for highly regulated countries the results are more
unstable with some countries being consistent (or weakly consistent) with the theory
(France and Spain, the less regulated in this group) while others contradicting it (Japan
and Italy, the more regulated in this group). Interestingly in all the cases where the the-
ory seems at least weakly consistent if we omit the market power distribution effect from
more collusive single markets to more competitive ones, our multimarket variable appears
to deliver biased estimates. Therefore, our data and results suggests that in the pharma-
ceutical industry the distribution of market power is a relevant feature to explain pricing
decisions. We expand further the analysis by asking about the relation between different
levels of price regulation and the multimarket mechanism. We discuss on the matter of
intense price regulation and suggest, in the context of the multimarket contact theory,
that bringing prices close to the one shot equilibrium -there is no need to reduce prices at
7See Berndt et al. (1995) for a discussion.
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the marginal cost- precludes the usage of market power in highly collusive markets as a
mean to increase prices in more competitive lines of production. The regression analysis
on this particular point suggest indeed that in the group of countries of more intense price
regulation, the equilibrium prices are expected to be, in general, lower than those of the
relatively free ones. That is, prices are predicted to be lower irrespective of the market
specific competitive conditions. This does not mean that in highly regulated countries
multimarket contact has no strategic effect, but that the effect is much less relevant than
in low regulated countries. This result deserves additional analysis because affecting the
performance of more competitive product markets, which are supposed to be out of the
scope of strong regulatory measures, can be shown to affect future entry decision and may
lead to less competition in the future.
The paper develops the streamline of analysis in the following structure: In section 2
the theoretical implications of multimarket contacts are described and discussed; we also
show how observed prices can be approached from this framework. Section 3 describes the
data set and the variables to be used. Next, section 4 presents the empirical specification
based on the discussion of section 2 and also present the relevant aspects of the econo-
metric methods, identification problems and solutions. Section 5 describes the results and
their interpretations as well as some robustness exercises. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The implications of multimarket contact
It is a well known result that firms could achieve more collusive outcomes when they expect
to meet and compete for an infinite number of periods. To achieve these outcomes, the
firms involved must design a set of credible penalties for deviating players. For instance,
if a firm decides to deviate from the collusive outcome, the penalty imposed could consist
of reverting for the remainder of the game to the equilibrium strategy for the stage game,
since this is also a subgame perfect equilibrium in the repeated game. In what follows
we present the implications of the multimarket contact theory and a discussion of the
possible effects of regulations over the collusive mechanism. We emphasize, however,
the specific case of product differentiation within markets and different levels of product
differentiation across markets to be in line with salient characteristics of the industry as
discussed in the introduction.
2.1 Observed prices from a multimarket perspective
To simplify the analysis, assume a market k where Nk firms producing symmetrically
differentiated products compete in prices and denote the equilibrium prices in the one
shot game by p∗i , i = 1, ..., Nk. Consider this as the stage game of an infinitely repeated
game with discounting. Let pmi denote the price that jointly maximizes the profits of all
the Nk firms in the market
8. Now firms have the possibility of choosing from a set of
alternative prices in the repeated game and tacitly support prices above the stage game
8With symmetric product differentiation it is expected that joint profit maximization give also a
symmetric price equilibrium. See Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Chang (1991).
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outcome in the long run. Detection of any deviation from this collusive outcome will be
penalized by all the members of the coalition by reverting to the stage game equilibrium
from then on. This also implies that market transparency is such that rivals can easily find
out whether a member of the coalition has defected or not, an assumption that has been
criticized from many instances in the literature 9. Denote by p
′
i the price for firm i in the
repeated game and assume that p
′
i ∈ [p∗i , pmi ]. p′i then is selected such that it maximizes
the present discounted value of the firm’s expected flow of profits subject to the incentive
constraint that loses implied by deviations from the collusive path are greater than the
implied gains 10:
δ
1− δ [pi
′
i − pi∗i ] ≥ pii(Ri(p
′
−i), p
′
−i)− pi
′
i (1)
where pi∗i and pi
′
i are firm i’s profits when prices are p
∗
i and p
′
i respectively, pii(Ri(p
′
−i), p
′
−i)
are firm i’s profits when all firms other that i set their collusive prices, p
′
−i, and firm i
chooses its best response to them, Ri(p
′
−i), and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Now,
note that if pmi is to be supported as a sub game perfect equilibrium, then it must be the
case that there is no profitable deviation from it, in other words it satisfies:
δ
1− δ [pi
m
i − pi∗i ] ≥ pii(Ri(pm−i), pm−i)− pimi (2)
Where pimi is firm’s i profits from the joint profit maximization outcome. While the left
hand side of this expression depends on δ, and increases monotonically in this argument,
the right hand side is independent of the discount factor. If we denote the left hand side
by F (δ, pimi − pi∗i ) the following condition is true:
F (0, pimi − pi∗i ) < pii(Ri(pm−i), pm−i)− pimi < F (1, pimi − pi∗i ) (3)
This expression implies the existence of some threshold for the discount factor, say δm,
above which the joint profit maximization outcome is a sub game perfect equilibrium.
Although other strategies may be supported in equilibrium by values above δm, we shall
assume that firms will select the highest price pimi . Below δ
m, pmi cannot be supported
and the maximum sustainable price is given by p+i (δ). Lets define the maximum sus-
tainable price as a function of the discount factor by p+i (δ) = max{pi ∈ [p∗i , pmi ) |
F (δ, pii − pi∗i ) ≥ pii(Ri(p−i), p−i) − pii)}. Note that the condition in this function when
p+i = p
∗
i implies F (δ, 0) = pii(Ri(p−i), p
∗
−i) − pi∗i ) = 0 and when p+i → pmi implies
F (δ, pmi ) < pii(Ri(p−i), p
m
−i) − pimi ); therefore if p+i (δ) > p∗i it should be the case that
the condition is hold with equality. To proceed with the analysis we need to make some
9For example a sudden reduction on a firm’s sales may be an indication that one or more rivals have
defected or can be just the result of a random demand shock which implies that perfect monitoring of
rivals’ decisions is not possible.
10More precisely, in a symmetric product differentiation set up p
′
i is the price that maximizes joint
profits under the constraint that loses from deviations are greater or equal than the gains from such an
strategy.
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monotonicity assumption on this function. Furthermore in the context of product het-
erogeneity, the way in which the discount factor affects the maximum sustainable price
depends on the nature of product differentiation. For instance, Chang (1991) showed that
in the context of symmetric horizontal product differentiation the maximum sustainable
price, also known as best collusive price, has the property that ∂p+i /∂δ > 0 while in the
case of vertical (quality) product differentiation explored by Ha¨ckner (1994) there is not
a clear answer. However, it is possible to show in the context of Hackner’s analysis that
given a level of (non symmetric) product differentiation, the price of the high quality
firm that maximizes joint profits is increasing in the discount factor. For our analysis
we will adopt the plausible property that p+i (δ) is a monotonically increasing function.
This implies the intuitive result that whenever future profits are more valuable, short run
benefits from defecting are accordingly less preferred. Therefore p
′
i, the collusive price,
will be a non-decreasing function of δ 11.
At any given δ, p
′
i will depend on the same cost and demand conditions that deter-
mine p∗i . This last fact together with assumption that p
′
i ∈ [p∗i , pmi ] and the discussion
above allows us to express p
′
i as a separable function of the equilibrium price in the stage
game and a function of the discount factor, p
′
i = Φ(δ) p
∗
i , where:
Φ(δ) =

pmi
p∗i
if δ > δm
p+i (δ)
p∗i
if δm > δ
Note that for sufficiently low δ (< δm) the most collusive outcome requires p+i = p
∗
i which
readily implies Φ(δ) = 1. From there this function increases until it reaches the upper
bound
pmi
p∗i
. Once this simple analysis is expanded to allow for the realistic situation in
which firms interact with their rivals in many independent markets, some interesting hy-
potheses on the expected strategic behavior of firms may be extracted.
To model the implications of multimarket contacts it is reasonably assumed that any
firm which intends to deviate from the collusive equilibrium in any market k will face a
penalty in every of the markets where it meets its market k rivals. Given that the pun-
ishment is going to spread over all the markets, when a firm decides to deviate from the
collusive strategy it does so simultaneously in all the markets where it operates. There-
fore, assuming that firm i is present in K independent markets, the incentive constraint
under the multimarket contact hypothesis becomes:
K∑
k=1
δk
1− δk [pi
′
ik − pi∗ik] ≥
K∑
k=1
{
piik(Rik(p
′
−ik), p
′
−ik) + pi
′
ik
}
(4)
This condition is a pooling of the K individual market incentive constraints. Given dif-
ferences in the levels of product differentiation, at any given value of δ, the maximum
11Bernheim and Whinston (1990) nevertheless mentions that ‘’Product heterogeneity within each mar-
ket adds considerable complexity since the maximum sustainable price typically increases continuously
as the discount factor, δ, rises‘’.
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sustainable price may differ substantially across markets. According to Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) analysis, optimality for firms involves allocating market power from
markets where collusion is easier to sustain to markets where it is more difficult or not
possible to sustain. Hence, from equation (4) we can extract the main implication for our
purposes:
As an illustration imagine a situation in which condition (1) holds as an equality for
all the markets where the firm is operating, i.e. p
′
ik = p
+
ik < p
m
ik for all k ∈ K. That is
full collusion is not sustainable. In this case, firms can reduce their price in a sub set
of markets so that condition (1) in these markets holds now as a strict inequality. In
this way firms create some slackness in a number of markets so that they can increase
prices in some (or all) of the rest of the markets, violating condition (1), as long as con-
dition (2) still holds. Along this line of argumentation, Bernheim and Whinston (1990)
conclude that under product differentiation firms can find it optimal to redistribute their
market power, giving up profits in some markets where the collective action is easier to
coordinate in order to increase profits in other markets where their conditions does not
support higher prices in equilibrium. Given the link between ease of collusion and demand
responsiveness, the expected outcome of this strategy is a positive net gain for the firm.
If we change the assumptions to consider homogeneous markets and we further assume
identical markets and firms’ characteristics across markets, both profits and losses from
deviating are multiplied by the number of markets where the firms are meeting, and the
set of strategies that form a subgame perfect equilibria remains unchanged 12.
In the context of the homogeneous goods assumption, when markets differ, for example
by different number of firms, or firms have market specific characteristics (have different
costs), we can obtain a larger set of sustainable equilibria for each market that still in-
cludes all the equilibrium strategies available in the absence of multimarket contact. In
particular, a firm can reach more collusive outcomes in some markets by violating condi-
tion (1) as long as this condition holds in other markets as a strict inequality, i.e., when
p
′
ik = p
m
ik for some k, and condition (2) holds for the whole set of markets where the firm
operates. In this case, according to Bernheim and Whinston (1990), firms can transfer the
slack of market power to other markets and increase prices in instances where collusion is
difficult or not possible to sustain. Note that this transference of market power differs to
the case of optimal allocation of market power in the heterogeneous products ambience.
However, we might conjecture that in the presence of product differentiation as well as
differences in the structure of the markets (e.g. differences in the number of firms) which
seems relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, both types of effects may be combined so
that different hypotheses can be jointly tested.
Turning back to our product heterogeneity assumption, given the structure of each k
market and as a consequence the structure of multimarket contacts for firm i, we can
12This is labelled as the irrelevance result by the authors. Spagnolo (1999), however, has shown that
when the objective function of the agent is strictly concave then multimarket contact can increase the
ability of firms to support collusion even if no asymmetries exist between markets.
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represent the firm’s equilibrium price of the repeated game in market k as a function of
three separable components:
p
′
ik = Γ(MMCik, θk) Φ(δk) p
∗
ik (5)
where Γ(MMCik, θk) > 0 measures the effect of the multimarket contacts structure given
by variable MMCik and some measure of the toughness of price competition at the stage
game in market k, which we denoted θk. In terms of the hypothesis of the strategic
behavior supported by the existence of multimarket contacts, the key prediction implies
that ∂
2Γ(.)
∂MMCik∂θk
> 0. That is, the strategic effect of multimarket contact over the repeated
game equilibrium price is expected to be increasing in the toughness of price competition.
More precisely, it is expected to observe Γ(MMCjik) < 1 in markets where a collusive price
is easier to support (less toughness of price competition) in equilibrium and Γ(MMCjik)
> 1 in markets with less favorable conditions to sustain collusion.
2.2 Effects of regulation on strategic behavior
How price regulation, and different intensities of price regulation may distort the multi-
market contact strategic effect is still to be answered from a theoretical point of view.
However we give here some initial thoughts on the likely effects of price regulation. The-
oretically price regulation reduce the ability of firms to price above marginal costs. In
a model of price competition with product differentiation even if we reduce exogenously
the price of only one competing variety of the market, other varieties should respond by
reducing their prices too given that typically in these models, optimal price responses are
strategic complements. If we conjecture that regulation will be more intense in product
markets where high prices can be sustained more easily, this public policy may reduce
prices in these type of markets further below to the level implied by the multimarket con-
tact theory. Accordingly, further slackness may be created so that prices in competitive
product markets could be conversely raised over the un-regulated case.
However if regulation is so intense such that prices are lowered exogenously until it reaches
the stage game equilibrium price, p∗i , no slackness is left for allocating market power to
more competitive markets, therefore intuitively we would expect that stricter price regu-
lation could lead to a reduction in prices belonging to more competitive product markets
with respect to the un-regulated equilibrium. This informal discussion gives us an initial
way to think about what to expect from the relation between multimarket contact and
price regulation in the pharmaceutical industry.
There are many types of regulations within the pharmaceutical industry across (OECD)
countries and even in a particular country many kinds of controls coexist. However, we
are interested in policies aim at cost containment of public health care systems, that is
policies aim at constraining pricing decisions and promoting the consumption of less ex-
pensive (alternative) drugs. Basically two types of price regulations can be identified, the
application of direct price caps and the application of reference pricing systems. The lat-
ter are supposed to relax the price elasticity of demand involving the otherwise indifferent
consumer into the selection of the pharmaceutical product to consume [See Danzon and
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Ketchman (2003) for a discussion on such form of regulation]. As such this type of price
regulation can be thought as a mild restrictive regulation.
Although we do not present a formal discussion on the likely effects of price regulations
over the multimarket contact equilibrium, in particular price ceilings for drug products,
the literature on the topic gives us some initial thoughts about the kinds of distortions
that may affect the strategic behavior of firms in this industry. Cabrales (2003) provides
a theoretical approach to the effects of price ceilings in the pharmaceutical industry us-
ing a vertical differentiation oligopolistic model. He is able to show that increasing the
stringiness of regulation increases the relative market share of the branded product with
respect to generic drugs, a result that is compatible with what is informally observed in
practice. In a related theoretical work, Miraldo (2007) have found that Reference Pricing
may actually increase equilibrium prices because the prices of reference to which drug
prices are subject to are the prices observed in the past. This result is observed both
for the case in which branded drugs share the market with generic drugs or when only
substitutes therapies are available as a mean for competitive pressure to branded products.
From an empirical perspective, Aronson et al. (2001) studies the effect of reference price
systems over well established brand name drugs. The results are mixed, showing a pos-
itive relation between price controls and brand name product market shares for some
products and a negative one for others so that this version of price controls seems to
increase or decrease relative market power. Likewise, Danzon and Chao (2000b) have
found that countries where price regulations are more strict, such as France, Italy and
Japan, price competition is in general less dynamic in contrast where prices are relatively
free such as USA, Germany and UK. It seems that actually strict price regulation in-
creases market power while mild or low regulation does not distort too heavily market
outcomes. Therefore, strict price regulation could be inducing a potential increase in slack
for less competitive markets and as a consequence higher prices in more competitive ones
compared to the equilibrium one would observe in countries with low and mild regulation.
From this discussion we may extract two potential hypotheses, either price regulations
in countries with intense controls in the industry exacerbates the strategic allocation of
market power, or pricing constraints are such that no market power is left to allocate from
less competitive product markets to more competitive ones.
3 Data and construction of the variables
3.1 Data set description and analysis
We use a multi-country and multi-product data set from the IMS MIDAS international
dataset for the period 1998-200313. This dataset encompasses a large number of countries
including the top ten in terms of medicine expenditures, as well as medium size and small
13We dispose of information from the 4th quarter of each year, apart from 2003, for which the infor-
mation is provided for the 2nd quarter.
3 DATA AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE VARIABLES 13
countries. We restrict here the analysis to data from nine OECD countries (see Table 1
for a list of the countries and data summary). The most widely used classification for
pharmaceutical products is the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classification or ATC
code which groups medicines in different levels starting from the basic chemical entity or
molecule at the bottom level. This classification provides the researcher an a priori way
to approach the study of markets for drugs with the possibility of using many alternative
relevant market definitions 14. The panel structure of the data set also provides the econo-
metrician with several sources of price variations that can be studied. This is particularly
interesting for our work given that market structure and the configuration of multimarket
contacts will vary across product markets, whatever their definition, and time.
As in any applied industrial organization and competition analysis, a correct market def-
inition is crucial. The pharmaceutical industry represents, however, a complex exercise
of market definition considering that shaping geographical boundaries within a country
or clear mutually exclusive sets of substitute products is not straightforward. We disre-
gard any delimitation of regional markets within a country, as it is reasonably to assume
that value to cost transportation in this industry is high. In the ATC classification, the
basic unit of differentiation between two products is the main chemical substance of the
products, called the molecule. When two products have the same chemical substance are
thought to be therapeutically equivalent. When they belong to different molecules they
can be imperfect substitutes for a therapy or have no relation at all. In the current study
we define a market as the set of products whose main chemical composite belongs to the
same molecule. However, this definition may be too narrow based on the well known fact
that different molecules can be used to treat the same medical condition. To overcome
this issue, we contrast the results with a broader definition of the market: the 4-digits
Anatomic Therapeutical Classification (ATC4) the molecule belongs in, however we do
not present the results to save space. Table 1 (panel B) presents the distribution of corpo-
rations depending on the number of markets supplied for the set of countries considered
in our sample, namely: US, Canada, Germany, UK, Netherlands, France, Italy, Japan,
and Spain.
This data set is specially valuable to conduct a cross country study which is of par-
ticular interest for the industry due to the different regulatory regimes each country have
designed and currently applies. Following the comprehensive study by Danzon and Chao
(2000b) as well as the advice of recognized experts15 we group the countries considered in
the sample in three regulatory categories. (I) US and Canada belong to the group of more
market friendly policies; (II) Germany, UK, Netherlands belong to the group of medium
intensity of price regulation; and, finally, (III) France, Italy, Japan, and Spain belong the
highly regulated group.
The list of variables that we construct is the following. The variable price, called Price,
14The ATC classification is supported and maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating
Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology with a base in the Norwegian Institute of Public Health.
15We are indebted to Guillem Lo´pez (UPF) and Vicente Ortu´n (UPF) and Fe´lix Lobo (UC3M) for
helpful advice on this regard.
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corresponds to sales revenue divided by the number of ‘standard units’ sold. The IMS
Midas database consider these standard units as standard quantities of products consid-
ering a recommended daily dosage. We convert the computed prices to US dollars. As
pointed out by several authors marginal costs are almost irrelevant in the industry [c.f.
Stern (1996)]. This suggests the use of a hedonic approach.16 Accordingly, in our pric-
ing regressions we incorporate this approach and include quality variables as regressors
to proxy the stage game equilibrium price. The quality variables for which we do have
information and therefore we include in our regressions are as follows: The variable firm’s
size, Fsize, is constructed as total corporation sales correcting it by excluding sales of the
product under analysis. Generic is a dummy variable which takes one if the product is a
generic, and Composite is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the product is
a combination of two or more molecules. Molecule age, Molage, is the time elapsed since
the molecule was launched to December 31, 2003. The age distribution of molecules and
products is presented in Table 1 (panel C). Competition variables related to the mark-up
are also computed. These variables are: Number of generics, Ngenerics, is the number of
generic products in each market. The Hirschmand-Herfinda¨hl concentration index, HHI,
is constructed using corporation sales value, with squared market shares of the corpora-
tion under analysis excluded from the index, H˜HI. We construct the market share of
each variety in the market, Mshare, and the aggregate market share of all other varieties
supplied by the same corporation in each market, Cshare. For the regression analysis we
use log transformations of Price, Fsize and Molage, so we value more the differences in
smaller than in larger values.
A number of dummy variables are also constructed: New is a dummy variable equal
to one if the product was launched in the previous year and zero otherwise, Censormol
equals 1 if the molecule was launched before January 1, 1991 and zero otherwise, Censor-
lag equals one for products launched before January 1, 1991 and zero otherwise. These
dummies are part of the quality variables used to capture price variation. Also a dummy
variable taking 1 if the product belongs to the generic segment and 0 for branded drugs.
The variable name is Dgeneric. Finally we also include a dummy taking 1 if the product
is a composite of various molecules, Composite
In addition to these variables, concerns on the endogeneity of some of the regressors
led us to find a way to include some additional information. The argument is that in
pharmaceutical markets, product differentiation in terms of attributes is of particular rel-
evance. However many important attributes are not observable from the econometrician
point of view because are not measurable or as it is in our case are absent from our data
set. The stage game price P ∗ik will be a function of marginal costs, usually thought to be
irrelevant in the industry, and a mark-up term. This mark-up will depend on some mea-
sures of market participation such as those commented lines above. However this mark-up
variables will be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the product i whose effect
by definition will be located in the error term. Abusing the language of the Instrumental
Variables approach to the problem, we put forward an identification assumption that the
16See Berndt, Cockburn and Griliches, 1996, Berndt, Pindyck and Azoulay, 1999, Cockburn and Anis,
1998, and Suslow, 1996.
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independence of markets across countries gives us the possibility of using the price of
other products in the same market definition in other countries to control for the unob-
served effects. The argument is that this prices will be correlated with time variable and
time invariant unobserved attributes of a number of products that interact with product
i in market k, information that is also relevant to the firm to set prices. However these
attributes of other products are not correlated with product’s i own characteristics and
as such helps us to control for some of the unknown price variability. The variable con-
structed is a global price, Gprice, which is the average price of the products belonging to
the same market definition of i but in other countries.
In addition, and regarding the same endogeneity problem, firm specific attributes that
are time invariant in the sample such as brand reputation are usually unobserved for the
econometrician and can be correlated with some of the left hand side variables. For these
reason we will used a fixed corporation effect approach in the regression analysis. Given
its relevance for this paper, the definition and construction of variables capturing the
influences of multimarket contact will be discussed in the following sub-section.
3.2 Alternative measures for multimarket contact
In the empirical literature briefly mentioned in the introduction, many different ways of
defining multimarket contact have been tried. From a purely strategic point of view,
there has been consensus that a contact of firm i with its rivals in the focal (or reference)
market k in other markets should reflect the importance of this last contact market for the
firm. This is considered in our definitions either by using market shares or concentration
indexes in terms of quantities or sales as weights for each market contact. Other impor-
tant general consideration is concerned to the extent to which individual price variation is
explained by the firm individual multimarket contacts variation or average multimarket
contact across firms within a given market. The former approach will for instance capture
the effect of small prediction power of multimarket contacts because of the presence of
small firms producing a very limited number of products. In contrast, the latter implies
that average multimarket contacts across firms within a market will affect all the firms in
this markets in the same way, no matter how many individual market contacts have each
firm. We will try both specifications.
With respect to the multimarket contact variable, an instance of multimarket contact
occurs, according to our definition, when a corporation i and its competitor l in the focal
market k, also meet in a different market m that we will call the contact market. If an
event of multimarket contact occurs we define a dummy variable Cil,km = 1, otherwise
Cil,km = 0. We define first individual measures of multimarket contact. The variable,
MMC, is defined:
MMCil,km = Cil,km Ym
where Y measures the corporations’ interests in the contact market m. We can think
of several instances for Y , such as the degree of concentration, the corporation’s market
share or the percentage of the corporations’ operations in that market. The measure of
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multimarket contact is the weighted average number of multimarket contacts with the
competitors in the focal market which is calculated as follows:
AVMMCik =
1
(Nk − 1)
∑
l 6=i
∑
m6=k
MMCil,km (6)
where Nk is the number of competitors in the focal market. An alternative way of
defining the multimarket contact variable is to average across all the weighted contacts of
every firm with its rivals in the focal market using the total number of potential pairings
of the same firms. In this case the multimarket contact variable will vary across markets
but remain fixed within markets. The definition will be given by:
AVMMCk =
1
(Nk(Nk − 1))/2
∑
i
∑
l 6=i
∑
m6=k
MMCil,km (7)
where (Nk(Nk − 1))/2 is the total number of possible pairings of the firms belonging to
market k. This indicator will punish markets where a large number of firms exists in the
focal market but very few interact with each other out of the focal market. Descriptive
statistics for these two definitions are shown in Table 2.
4 Empirical specification and Econometric methods
In section 2 we have shown an expression for the observed price of a product considering
the multimarket structure of the industry. Therefore the price for a product j of firm i in
market k, denoted p
′
jik, can be represented as a separable function of its equilibrium price
in the stage game, p∗jik, a mark-up on this price which depends on the discount factor,
δ, and a function of the degree of multimarket contact and the ease of collusion in both
the focal and the contact market. Assuming linearity we consider the following log-linear
specification:
log(p
′
jikt) = α+ Ω(MMCikt, θkt) + Φ(δi) + log(p
∗
jikt) (8)
where t denotes time, Ω(MMCikt, θk) = log Γ(MMCikt(θkt)), and α is a parameter. Note
that the multimarket contact indicator varies across firms within a given market. In the
related literature this variable is considered fixed within markets in most of the cases.
This approach is based on the assumption that the complete set of contacts within a
market will affect the pricing decisions of all the firms in the same amount. However
we may think of small firms within a market for which multimarket contact does not
explains too much variation on prices. This is the case of the pharmaceutical markets
where large corporations share a given market with small producers. Allowing for a
multimarket contact indicator that varies across firms helps us to factor in possible effects
of the presence of local firms, in particular over the ability of firms to coordinate. The
log of the stage game equilibrium price is specified as:
log(p∗jikt) = X
1′
jiktβ1 +X
2′
jikβ2 + Z
1′
ktγ1 + Z
2′
k γ2 + η1i + vjikt (9)
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where the Xs and Zs are vectors of respectively time-variant and time-invariant variables
concerning product j of firm i on one hand, and market k on the other, that poten-
tially affect the stage game equilibrium prices through different meaningful ways, β, and
γ are the corresponding parameter vectors, η1i is a firm fixed effect and vjikt contains
unobserved elements for the econometrician. Given the product differentiation nature of
pharmaceutical markets we can interpret the pricing equation as a function of variables
affecting marginal costs (which are usually thought to be negligible in this industry) and
the product’s mark-up such as observed attributes that are fixed or vary through time.
From a structural point of view these attributes will affect the firm’s and specific product
market shares. At the same time, the fixed effect is included to control for elements of
vertical (quality) product differentiation which are one of the most highlighted peculiar-
ities of this industry. The vjikt can be regarded as that information on attributes that
are not observed by the econometrician but firm’s do take into account when taking their
pricing decisions. To complete the specification, we use the following expression for the
discount factor function:
Φ(δjikct) = η2i + λt (10)
That is, taking advantage of the panel structure of the data, we proxy the discount
factor by an specific firm effect η2i, and λt, a time specific factor. After replacing these
expressions in the above equation we obtain:
log(p
′
jikt) = α+Ω(MMCikt, θk) +X
1′
jiktβ1 +X
2′
jikβ2 +Z
1′
ktγ1 +Z
2′
k γ2 + ηi + λt + vjikt (11)
where ηi = η1i + η2i.
In some of the related works reviewed [e.g. Evans and Kessides (1994)] there is some
important industry specific features that call for controlling for market fixed effects which
are absent in our specification. The need for including market effects should be supported
by relevant structural characteristics. For example, in the airline industry, a market de-
fined as a route has important structural characteristics such as market specific fixed
costs. In our case we do not believe similar structural conditions are of relevance for the
pharmaceutical markets, which are in this case defined as product markets 17. However we
are in fact identifying the effects of important time-invariant product and market features
in the industry through the inclusion of the X2jik and Z
2
k vectors respectively.
We estimate equation (11) country by country using a Within Groups panel data method,
where the firms’ specific heterogeneity effect νi are accounted for. Some of the left hand
side variables are potentially endogenous, mainly because they can be directly influenced
by unobserved attributes of the product in the stage game price equations. For instance,
as we will see in the next sub-section, different market shares definitions are incorporated
as regressors. For these reason we adopt the identifying assumption that product mar-
kets are conditionally independent across time and countries and the global price variable
17Nonetheless we estimated an alternative specification with market fixed effects which showed to be
much less significative than our present specification.
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is used so as to control for time varying unobserved features. In addition we use the
panel data structure of the data and variables that are thought to be endogenous to the
disturbances are lagged one period in an attempt to further avoid inconsistent estimators.
Table A: Variable Names and Definitions
Variable Definition
Pricejikt Price in USD of product j belonging to firm i
Pricegjikt Global Price in USD for product j belonging to firm i
Fsizejikt Quantity size of firm i in certain country excluding quantity sales of product j
Newjikt Binary variable, taking 1 if product j was launched in the previous year
Dgenericjik Binary variable, taking 1 if product j is a generic
Compositejik Binary variable, taking 1 if product j is a compound of molecules
H˜HIjikt Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for market k excluding product j’s share
MSharejikt Market share of product j in market k
CSharejikt Corporation share in market k excluding product j’s share
Censorlagjik Binary variable, taking 1 if product j was launch date is censored in the sample
Ngenericskt Number of generic products in market k
Molagek Time elapsed up to 2003 since molecule (market) k was launched
Censormolk Binary variable, taking 1 if molecule age is censored in the sample
AVMMCikt Weighted average multimarket contact variable for firm i in market k
AVMMCkt Alternative weighted average multimarket contact variable in market k
4.1 Variables and multimarket contact definition
To sum up, the different groups of variables included in the panel data regression are
as follows. Variables that vary across products and time are: the corrected Firm’s size
variable, in order to proxy firm’s brand image that spills over all its products, a dummy
variable indicating if the product was launched in the previous year to proxy for entry
lag disadvantages, the corrected Herfinda¨hl-Hirschman index, the product’s market share
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and other products’ joint market share; a variable that varies across products but is time
invariant is the dummy indicating if the product was launched before January 1, 1991.
18. Likewise, variables that varies across markets and time are: the molecule age to proxy
for inverse efficiency, and the number of generic products in the market; a variable that
varies across markets but is time invariant is the dummy indicating whether the age of the
molecule is left censored in January 1, 1991. Firm’s size and molecule age are included in
logs in order to give more weight to differences in small vales than in large values.
Among the competition variables we include the number of generics and the Herfinda¨hl-
Hirschman concentration index. Both variables are potentially endogenous, accordingly
the former is lagged one period and the latter is corrected excluding the squared market
share of the product under analysis. We also include the market shares of the product
under analysis and of other drugs of the same corporation in the market, since we would
expect that higher sales lead to higher prices. Again both variables could be regarded as
endogenous and we lag them one period.
For the purposes of this paper, the most important independent variable is the one de-
scribing multimarket contact. Provided with this measure of multimarket contact, we
consider two different specifications for Ω(MMCikt). Firstly,
(A.1) Ω(MMCikt) = α1 AVMMCikt
which is independent of the characteristics of the focal market. This specification
can allow us to test the sign and significance of the effect that the variable measuring
multimarket contact has on prices in average terms. A positive and significant sign for α1
would be consistent with the traditional view on multimarket contact, but it could also
be measuring the effects of omitted variables highly related to multimarket contact, such
as the establishment size.
Secondly,
(A.2) Ω(MMCikt, θkt) = α(θkt) AVMMCikt
where the assumption in (A.1) is now relaxed allowing for heterogeneity of the multi-
market contact effect across markets. The effect of a specific contact in market k can be
stated as a function of the ease of collusion in the market, θk in a way which represents
the transfer of market power from one market to others. We use the variable HHIk, to
measure ease of collusion adopting the result of most dynamic oligopoly models by which
the higher the market concentration the more collusive the output of the repeated game.
Following a specification by Cabrales (1995) also used by Ferna´ndez and Mar´ın (1998),
we specify α(θ(HHIkt)) as
α(θ(HHIkt)) = α1 + α2 HHIkt
Therefore, we can rewrite (A.2) as
18The launch date information we have is left censored at this particular date.
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(A.2b) Ω(MMC ikt, θ(HHIkt)) = α1 AVMMCikt + α2 HHIkt AVMMCikt
According to Bernheim and Whinston (1990), we expect to observe α1 > 0, which means
that in markets with little capacity of collusion, i.e., low HHIk, MMC has a positive
effect on prices. This effect has to decrease as the ease of collusion, measured by HHIk,
increases, i.e., we expect α2 < 0. Additionally, the theory predicts that α(θkt) is to be
equal to zero for a value of HHIk between the minimum and the maximum values in
our set of observations. Summing up, the effect of multimarket contact is expected to
be greater in absolute terms if the variable measuring the ease of collusion in the focal
market, HHIk, is among either the largest or the smallest in the sample, being positive
in markets with very low values for HHIk and negative in markets with very high values
for HHIk. The analysis is invariant to the alternative definition of multimarket contacts
where the variable MMC is the average of the sum of the weighted contacts of each firm
in the focal market and as such is invariant within markets.
5 Results and interpretation
5.1 Results from baseline specifications
Tables 3 to 5 present the set of basic results, running a regression of Log (Price) on the
set of quality and competition characteristics as well as multimarket contact variables
explained above and when the market is defined as the molecule and the multimarket
variables are firm specific (as defined in 6). In these and other tables the results are
shown with the countries grouped from the more market friendly ones to the more heav-
ily regulated in prices. The regressions in all cases include time trends and fixed effects
at the corporation level. Accordingly, the t-statistics shown in parenthesis are computed
with robust standard errors clustering the observations by corporations. Table 2 does not
include multimarket contact variables. Its purpose is to show to what extent the remain-
ing variables explain prices in the different countries and the type of consequences that
the omission of relevant structural variables entails. It can be seen that variables New,
Fsize, Priceg, Composite and Molage have the expected signs in all the cases, however
not significant in very few of them. Firm size, Fsize, is highly significant, indicating that
large corporations enjoy higher prices either because its products are of higher quality or
perceived as such. Molage has a negative impact showing that the prices fall with the
life-cycle of the molecule. The composite dummy has mixing results. For example, for
the US has a negative effect while for Germany is positive. However, Censormol which
is expected also to have a negative effect appear to be with the wrong sign but with weak
significance in most cases. These variables proxy molecule efficiency since new molecules
are expected to improve upon previously existing molecules. New is also negative, in-
dicating that new products launched in an existing market suffer from some late entry
disadvantage.
Consistently, Censorlag is positive in most cases, showing that products launched in
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the market before January 1991 maintain higher prices than those launched later within
the same market. For three countries where regulation is more stringent, this variable ap-
pears with positive sign. The latter may be indicating that old products which are likely
to belong to large corporations suffer from price regulation. In most cases however the
variable is not significantly different from zero. Regarding generics we find that the price
of generics are, with the exception of Canada, significantly lower than other prices. Re-
sults for the number of generics are somewhat mixing. As explained in the introduction,
the presence of generics on a market does not mean that brand name products will reduce
their prices. The evidence presented by the specialized literature is mixed. In some cases,
the presence of generics will have the impact of concentrating brand name products over
the inelastic portion of the demand which will then increase the price of these products.
Hence, the expected sign of the number of generics will be positive. In our results this
is the case of US, Germany, Netherlands, UK –the strongest effect, and France. On the
other hand, the number of generics or generic competition, will reduce prices for everyone
whenever, for instance, the quality of the existing products is not necessarily perceived to
be high enough. In our results this seems to be the case of Canada alone. Note finally,
that the effect of the number of generics is negligible in the more regulated countries
(Italy, Japan, and Spain).
The HHI concentration index, H˜HI, is not significant and in some cases appear with
the wrong sign. For the market share of the product, Mshare, and of other corporation’s
products in the same market, Cshare, the expected signs are observed except for the par-
ticular cases of Canada, France and Spain. These variables are lagged before including
them in the regressions for obvious potential endogeneity problems. Also, for the ma-
jority of less regulated countries, Mshare is significant while Cshare is not, and taking
Japan as an exception, these variables are not significant for highly regulated countries.
The unintuitive results for the signs of the variables proxying competition may be due
to inconsistent estimators because of the omission of variables that are related to market
power in the dynamic game. These is expected to be true for Canada where prices are
expected to be highly market based while in Spain and France the inclusion of the omitted
variables may not solve the question because of interactions with particular regulatory
arrangements.
From these first set of results interesting preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First, it
appears that most attributes and quality characteristics explains a reasonable portion of
price variations which is robust across countries. This suggest that different degrees of
regulation does not distorts the effects of these attributes. The only attribute that seems
to have a different effect with respect to the level of regulation is Censorlag, although
the significance of the variable is in general poor. With respect to variables controlling
competition, apart from the number of generics, although not significant in many cases
at least the signs appear correct for most less regulated countries, excluding Canada.
Table 4 presents the results of the same regressions after including the average multimar-
ket contact variable, AVMMC. All other coefficients remain fairly stable and AVMMC is
positive and significant for Canada and less evident for the UK, it is not significant for
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the rest of the countries excluding France where it is negative and significant.
Table 5 allows for the possibility of a differentiated effect of AVMMC on prices depending
on the concentration of the reference market, that proxies ease of collusion. According
to the theory, in presence of multimarket contact, prices are expected to fall in markets
where it is easier to reach collusive outcomes whilst they are expected to increase where it
is more difficult to collude. This means that the coefficient for AVMMC, α1, is expected
to be positive and the coefficient for AVMMC*HHI , α2,is expected to be negative, with
the latter larger in absolute value than the former. The results for the less regulated
countries plus France are strongly consistent with the theory except for the UK, i.e., both
coefficients are significant, have the expected signs and |α2| > α1, for US, Canada, Ger-
many the Netherlands and France (see figure 1). In addition, the coefficients are weakly
consistent, e.g., have the expected signs but either one or both of them are not significant,
for UK and Spain. Only for the case of Italy the coefficients contradict the theory in both
cases and for Japan the sign of α2 is incorrect. In addition, after controlling for these
effects, the coefficients associated to H˜HI, Mshare and Cshare appear with the correct
sign with the first two groups of countries however not significant in some cases. For the
heavily regulated countries still nonintuitive signs remains with the vast majority being
not significant.
As noted in the previous section, for the countries where the theory is supported it is
possible to find a threshold for the concentration index below which the equilibrium price
is affected positively and above which it is reduced through the multimarket contact
mechanism. We show these thresholds graphically in figure 1 at the end of the document.
It can be seen that for the less regulated countries, this level of concentration is above
0.8. The result then suggest that the multimarket contact mechanism of market power
redistribution is predicted to function at very high levels of concentration, which in turns
suggest that the creation of some market power slack is possible only at substantially low
levels of competition.
5.2 Sensibility analysis: MMC and Market definitions
We perform two different exercises to test for the sensibility of the results. On one hand
we change the definition of the multimarket variables MMC to allow only for changes
of average multimarket contacts in explaining price variation. To this end we use the
mutimarket variable computed as in the second definition in section 3.2. On the other
hand, we broaden the definition of a relevant market and consider the four-digit group-
ing of the ATC classification or ATC4. Accordingly, a market is defined as the group
of molecules or chemical substances that belongs to the same chemical, pharmacological
and therapeutical set. For space reasons we do not show the entire set of outputs, only a
brief report on the effects of changing the MMC variable definition [The complete set of
results for both exercises is available upon request.
Table B present a comparison between the baseline results for the MMC effects with
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those using the alternative definition for the MMC variable.19 Perhaps the only change
worth to notice is that of the increase of the effect of MMC variables both in size and
significance for some countries. As shown in the summary Table B, both α1 and |α2| in-
creases substantially (in absolute value) for the US, the Netherlands and the UK, decrease
substantially for Canada and France, while remaining almost unchanged for the rest of
the countries. The explanation for these results seems to be purely statistical. Given the
sign of effect of multimarket contacts in the market, if changing the definition reduces
the variability of the AVMMC regressors when averaging within markets, the size of this
effect may increase in absolute value.
Table B: Marginal effects of MMC variables by definition
(Robust T-statistics in parenthesis)
Def./Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Definition 1
AVMMCik,t−1 0.066 0.134 0.028 0.030 0.068 0.031 -0.022 0.002 0.119
(2.43) (5.39) (2.91) (1.87) (1.02) (3.02) (-0.28) (0.04) (1.02)
AVMMCik,t−1* -0.092 -0.173 -0.030 -0.027 -0.043 -0.090 0.111 0.003 -0.293
H˜HIk,t−1 (-2.96) (-6.33) (-3.71) (-1.46) (-0.44) (-4.13) (0.78) (0.04) (-0.99)
elasticity .0167 .0783 .0565 .0604 .0242 -.074 .0136 .0040 .0280
(at sample means) (0.70) (1.82) (2.03) (1.95) (2.0) (2.92) (0.71) (0.173) (0.67)
Definition 2
AVMMCkt−1 0.081 0.072 0.022 0.184 0.110 0.010 -0.003 -0.013 0.023
(4.96) (6.31) (5.64) (3.95) (1.49) (1.17) (-0.13) (-0.40) (0.22)
AVMMCkt−1∗ -0.099 -0.115 -0.020 -0.186 -0.100 -0.023 0.028 0.030 -0.093
H˜HIkt−1 (-3.25) (-6.32) (-3.16) (-3.22) (-1.00) (-1.30) (0.54) (0.80) (-0.38)
elasticity .0426 -.0057 .0826 .0830 .0218 -.0193 .0076 .0056 -.0209
(at sample means) (2.43) (0.10) (4.18) (4.17) (2.77) (0.95) (1.19) (0.316) (0.65)
Table B also presents a comparison of the country specific implicit sample mean price
elasticity to the number of contacts. In the case of results for MMC definition 1, the
sample means elasticity is positive for low and medium regulated countries (being the
US an exception) and non-significant or negative for strong regulated countries. Similar
(but more significant in some cases) are the results when considering MMC definition 2,
although in this case the sample means price elasticity to the number of contacts is signif-
icant for the US and non-significant in Canada. Even more illustrative is Figure 2, which
shows the profile of the elasticity of the price to the number of contacts by HHI quan-
tile (for each of the quantiles considered, the number of contacts is evaluated at sample
means). For all the low and medium regulated countries the elasticity is relatively high
for low values of the concentration index and decreases with the degree of concentration.
For the US and Canada, the elasticity turns negative for degrees of concentration above
19No remarkable changes appear to occur either on the variables controlling for firm and market char-
acteristics and those controlling for competitive elements not including the MMC variables.
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0.75 and 0.80 respectively, which are well above the respective country specific average
concentration indexes (0.585 and 0.636 respectively). Alternatively, for Germany, the
Netherlands and UK the elasticity remains positive for practically all the potential values
of the concentration index. For strong regulated countries the evidence is mixing. In any
case, we want to stress that for France and Spain (the two strong regulated countries in
which the effect of the number of contact goes in accordance with the theory), the degree
of concentration from which the elasticity turns negative is clearly below the country spe-
cific average concentration indexes (0.63 and 0.61 respectively).
With respect to the alternative market definition, in general, the results (not shown)
of broadening the market definition appear to affect both the size and significance of the
hypotheses derived from the multimarket contact theory to the point of rejecting them
from the data in most cases. Curiously, the results for Italy that before rejected the
theory, now seem to fit in it very well. As a very preliminary conclusion, the results as
it could be expected are very sensitive to changes on the side of the market definition.
However, changing from a molecule definition to an ATC4 definition may be a too difficult
condition to satisfy for the theory. A more rigorous analysis should require small variation
in the definition of a relevant market, perhaps including specific molecules that are closer
substitutes to each other. At this point the information available does not allow us for
these type of exercises nevertheless it is an important item in the future research agenda.
5.3 A first extension on the regulatory effects
In subsection 2.2 we have discussed informally the likely effects of price regulation over
the effect of multimarket contact. We conjectured that if price regulation constrain prices
in more collusive markets such that no slackness in the incentive constraint of firms is
left to be used in more competitive markets, then equilibrium prices should be lower in
general in more regulated countries.
In Table 6 we present the results for pooled sample regressions. In addition to the
usual set of regressors, whose results are shown in columns (1) to (3) of the aforemen-
tioned table, we consider interacting the following the variables Ngenerics, AVMMC
and AVMMC ∗ H˜HI with a dummy, Dreg, which takes the value one if the the obser-
vation pertains to one of the four highly regulated countries in the sample. Likewise we
control for corporation × country specific effects to account for idiosyncratic elements at
this level, and year dummies. All the specifications are able to explain a great deal of the
variability of prices within and across countries.
The results in columns (1) to (3) show that the significant quality variables are not
affected by the omission of the MMC variables. On the other hand, it appears the ef-
fect of the competition variables (H˜HI, Mshare and Cshare, and, to a lesser extent,
ngenerics) are inconsistently estimated when no controls for the MMC structure are
considered. The marginal effects for AVMMC and AVMMC ∗ H˜HI are significant and
consistent with the prediction that the latter (-0.051) should be greater than the former
(0.43) in absolute value. Jointly they imply that the effect of multimarket contact on
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prices turns negative only for values of the concentration index above 0.84. At sample
means, they also imply a 3.2 percent elasticity of prices to the number of contacts.
Columns (4) to (6) contains the analogue results to columns in (1) to (3) with the addition
of the interactions of respectively Ngenerics, AVMMC and AVMMC ∗ H˜HI with a
dummy representing the strong regulated countries in sample (France, Italy, Japan, and
Spain). When comparing columns (1) to (3) with columns (3) to (6), with the sole ex-
ception of Ngenerics whose coefficient gets reduced by a third, all the significant quality
and competition regressors remain fairly stable. Moreover, as in columns (1) to (3), the
omission of the MMC variables produce biased estimates of the competition variables.
Finally, the coefficients of the multimarket contact variables increase (in absolute terms)
by 10 percent (from 0.43 to 0.48 and from -0.051 to -0.055). These coefficients imply, at
sample means, a 4.8 percent average elasticity of prices to the number of contacts for low
and medium regulated countries.
Figure 3 presents the surface or contour plot of the price elasticity by combination of
(average) number of contacts and Herfinda¨hl index for low and medium regulated coun-
tries. Each level curve describes the combinations of number of contacts and concentration
index which lead to the same value of the elasticity. The price elasticity is positive for
all values of the Herfinda¨hl index below a number close to 0.9 and it increases with the
number of contacts and it decreases with the concentration index.
With respect to the interaction between the multimarket contact variables and the num-
ber of generics with the regulation dummy we obtain the following findings. Firstly, the
interaction with the number of generics is positive and significant, thereby indicating that
the number of generics in a molecule increases more the price in the strong regulated
countries than in medium or low regulated countries. Secondly, the direct effect of the
interaction of the regulatory dummy with the multimarket contact variable is negative
and significant. Thirdly, the effect of the strategic multimarket contact variable, that is
the effect AVMMC ∗H˜HI, is marginally negative but insignificant20. Jointly, they imply
that the elasticity of prices to the number of contacts in regulated countries is -2.8 percent.
Figure 4 presents the same concept as in Figure 3 but now for the strongly regulated
countries. The elasticity of the price to the number of contacts turns in this case negative
for all values of the Herfinda¨hl index above 0.3, however the price elasticity for low levels
of concentration show positive but much lower figures than those of the low regulation
case. As in the case of low regulated countries the price elasticity increases with the
number of (average) contacts and decreases with the concentration index.
These results suggest that for countries where price regulations are intense there exists
a multimarket effect which delivers lower equilibrium prices in all the product markets
irrespective of their degree of competition, as measured by the corresponding concentra-
tion index. We interpret this result as an indication that price regulation in the more
20When France is removed from the group of highly regulated countries the coefficient turns positive
but still insignificant.
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regulated countries are intense enough to reduce the instances in which some slackness in
the incentive constraint in more collusive markets can be used to increase prices in more
competitive ones. Therefore, coupling the empirical results with the theoretical discussion
in section 2.2, the data appear to support the hypothesis that intense price regulation
is bad for the multimarket contact equilibrium and seems to reject the alternative that
intense price regulation exacerbates the strategic effect of market power allocation.
6 Concluding remarks
The theoretical literature of dynamic oligopoly models have proposed some interesting
results from the situation in which firms contact with their rivals in several markets. A
traditional view predicts the Mutual Forbearance Hypothesis by which firms may increase
the set of collusive equilibria because of repeated interactions in many independent mar-
kets. Furthermore, when appropriate incentive constraints permits, multimarket contact
may also promote the re-distribution of market power from markets with easier conditions
for collusion to markets where colluding is more difficult. The first hypothesis has been
successfully studied for several industries such as the US’s industries of cement, cellular
communications, airline services, banking and others while studies for Europe have been
conducted for the Banking industry and the Spanish hotel industry, the latter been also
approached considering the re-distribution of market power. We expand on this empirical
literature by considering the effects of the multimarket structure in the pharmaceutical
industry using panel data for nine countries of the OECD. The cross country nature of the
data allow us to control for a very important feature of the industry which is the different
degrees of regulation and in particular price controls. We perform panel data regressions
for specifications in which we incorporate several important issues such as the relevance
of quality variables in the industry, the importance of corporation fixed effects to control
for quality product differentiation, and an instrumental variables argument to control for
possible endogeneity of variables related to the competitive environment. The multimar-
ket structure is also part of the specification in such a way that provides a simple relation
between the contacts and the ease of collusion across markets to test both the tradi-
tional and the more strategically based hypotheses predicted by the theory. The baseline
model appears to fit the hypotheses of multimarket contact reasonably well for the case
of less regulated markets while for those countries where price regulation is more intense
the results are more unstable. This suggest, as intuitively expected, that in more reg-
ulated markets there are some existing distortions that are interacting with market forces.
Given the above result we ask ourselves about the likely effect of price regulation over
the multimarket contact mechanism. To answer that question we propose to pool the
countries’ sub-samples and interact the multimarket variables with an indicator variable
for heavily regulated countries. We took this route based on the observation that in gen-
eral the marginal effects of the quality variables and some competition variables does not
change too widely across countries in the sample. The results suggest that price interven-
tions in more concentrated markets induces a reduction in prices also in more competitive
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-less regulated- markets. The theoretical justification for this result, although not for-
mally shown, is related to the fact that price regulation may be so intense that little
market power is left to be allocated to more competitive product markets. This result is
of paramount importance for policy making. Since price controls and related regulatory
systems barely take into account the structure of the industry and its peculiarities, our
work could be of great interest to empirically predict undesirable effects of public inter-
ventions in this particular case. For instance, reducing prices in more competitive markets
compared to the prevailing level in the un-regulated case may discourage entry and may
have a negative dynamic effect in the development of the industry. Projecting this idea
onto the debate of imposing further price restrictions in current less regulated countries
[See a brief discussion in Santere and Vernon (2005)], our result provides an alternative
explanation for the observation that in highly regulated markets entry is less likely, both
of innovative products and alternative varieties of an existing drug. [c.f. Danzon et al.
(2005) and Kyle (2007)].
Possible extensions of this analysis include specializing for specific product markets such
as those for anti-ulcer or anti-hypertensive drugs. Focusing on specific cases will help to
model in a more precise fashion features such as horizontal product and vertical product
differentiation, precise definitions of price regulations on their strategic effects so that
more structure could be given to the analysis. Likewise, one could also use as a start-
ing point the idea of defining specific countries as different markets of the same industry
structure much in the way states of the US are considered. For example, contacts among
firms across EU countries could also be a dimension to study.
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Figure 1: Effect of multimarket contact in selected markets. Market definition: molecule.
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Figure 2: Estimated Price elasticities at the average MMC means by HHI-quintile. note: for
each HHI-quintile the number of contacts has been set to the sample average.
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Figure 3: Estimated price elasticities to multimarket structure for low and medium regulated
countries.
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Figure 4: Estimated Price elasticities to multimarket structure for highly regulated countries
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics by country
No. markets No. No. molecule ATC4
Type country molec. ATC4 corp. products HHI HHI
(A) (C) mean median mean median
I Canada 867 213 160 2552 .159 .080 .23 .148
US 1574 264 621 7170 .531 .492 .167 .093
II Germany 1874 261 587 6985 .514 .451 .152 .082
Nether 421 146 87 1148 .668 .764 .365 .246
UK 618 189 147 1143 .663 .830 .377 .283
III France 782 214 164 1929 .569 .500 .254 .191
Italy 726 215 253 1992 .533 .499 .265 .179
Japan 674 181 174 2401 .508 .435 .253 .163
Spain 660 220 179 1693 .523 .496 .295 .205
Panel B: Distribution of corporations by country
Type country 1 2-4 5-9 10-14 15-20 21+ Total
I Canada 48 30 30 15 4 33 160
US 232 178 91 26 22 72 621
II Germany 208 141 94 46 32 66 587
Nether 18 28 14 9 5 13 87
UK 49 45 25 7 8 13 147
III France 54 46 30 10 5 19 164
Italy 65 81 49 30 11 17 253
Japan 32 32 43 20 19 28 174
Spain 43 45 36 22 15 18 179
Panel C: Distribution of molecule age by country
Type country 1 1-2 3-4 4-7 7-10 11+ Total
I Canada 17 107 104 247 309 83 867
US 17 190 246 418 405 298 1,574
II Germany 45 338 218 423 512 338 1,874
Nether 12 64 67 132 100 46 421
UK 17 93 104 212 130 62 618
III France 24 94 126 294 151 93 782
Italy 16 96 136 264 143 71 726
Japan 8 104 123 191 171 77 674
Spain 22 106 119 215 127 71 660
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Table 2: Summary of Statistics for Alternative MMC definitions
Country MMC Def. mean S.D. N min max
Canada AVMMCi 3.267787 4.539079 7306 0 23.31294
AVMMCk 5.03172 5.816102 7306 0 43.06461
US AVMMCi 1.376322 1.887178 15519 0 21.28824
AVMMCk 1.845514 2.593831 15519 0 30.93439
Germany AVMMCi 4.390942 7.594441 17365 0 43.61862
AVMMCk 6.930001 9.209209 17365 0 74.30422
Nether AVMMCi 6.304839 8.160128 2621 0 41.54391
AVMMCk 1.910695 2.200827 2621 0 16.65326
UK AVMMCi .7167481 1.819917 3077 0 14.53169
AVMMCk .7099619 1.704774 3077 0 15.96973
France AVMMCi 2.893824 4.328823 5799 0 19.00629
AVMMCk 4.305282 6.236178 5799 0 77.77623
Italy AVMMCi .307457 .5662813 5760 0 4.732938
AVMMCk .5597214 1.792093 5760 0 25.99545
Japan AVMMCi 1.098841 1.572164 5350 0 13.53323
AVMMCk 1.580326 5.534312 5350 0 51.27918
Spain AVMMCi .4650383 .7450629 5075 0 4.525763
AVMMCk .6174125 1.139168 5075 0 10.482
Note:
Subindex i refers to a definition that varies across corporations, while subindex k
to a definition that varies across markets
A FIGURES AND TABLES 35
Table 3: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corporation
fixed effects. Without controlling for multimarket contact. Market definition: molecule
(Robust Standard Errors by Corporation Clusters)
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 -0.067 -0.320 -0.221 -0.236 -0.309 -0.161 -0.187 -0.190 -0.160
(-1.39) (-4.91) (-7.14) (-3.50) (-6.53) (-3.71) (-4.69) (-4.09) (-3.45)
Fsizet−1 0.240 0.286 0.220 0.114 0.213 0.171 0.161 0.318 0.160
(15.21) (11.22) (14.95) (5.01) (11.34) (8.63) (7.92) (13.33) (7.52)
Molaget -0.437 -0.267 -0.166 -0.114 -0.247 -0.195 -0.142 -0.103 -0.324
(-6.71) (-3.08) (-4.49) (-1.78) (-2.34) (-2.88) (-2.57) (-1.49) (-4.73)
Censormolt -0.009 0.036 0.112 0.057 -0.413 -0.065 0.161 0.091 0.166
(-0.12) (0.33) (2.05) (0.55) (-2.16) (-0.34) (1.44) (0.41) (1.04)
Censorlagt 0.429 0.070 0.020 0.100 1.033 0.500 -0.209 -0.412 -0.097
(2.09) (0.17) (0.20) (0.90) (2.99) (2.00) (-0.68) (-0.89) (-0.32)
Dgeneric -0.319 0.068 -0.060 -0.182 -0.726 -0.406 -0.206 -0.023 -0.396
(-3.23) (0.47) (-0.92) (-1.34) (-3.26) (-3.46) (-2.38) (-0.17) (-4.12)
Composite -0.155 -0.133 0.085 -0.042 -0.184 0.100 0.094 -0.025 -0.089
(-1.96) (-1.87) (1.96) (-0.60) (-1.58) (1.44) (1.71) (-0.24) (-1.35)
Ngenericst 0.011 -0.047 0.008 0.029 0.129 0.048 0.002 0.023 0.003
(2.05) (-3.47) (4.06) (1.94) (4.54) (5.26) (0.29) (1.17) (0.56)
Pricegt−1 0.538 0.528 0.652 0.856 0.600 0.672 0.685 0.594 0.690
(15.31) (14.30) (21.11) (29.07) (16.73) (18.77) (21.73) (21.69) (18.72)
Dpricegt−1 -1.205 -1.372 -1.565 -1.263 -1.068 -1.632 -1.148 -0.503 -0.831
(-7.98) (-8.22) (-13.81) (-1.99) (-5.76) (-7.65) (-6.64) (-1.99) (-4.05)
H˜HIt−1 0.228 -1.024 -0.136 0.122 0.425 0.206 0.390 0.184 -0.780
(1.89) (-4.23) (-1.32) (0.69) (2.03) (1.03) (3.17) (1.30) (-4.77)
Msharet−1 0.720 -0.473 0.455 0.388 0.510 0.632 0.162 0.509 -0.567
(5.31) (-1.85) (5.64) (2.12) (2.25) (3.94) (1.47) (3.21) (-4.69)
Csharet−1 0.425 -0.742 0.008 0.111 0.312 0.242 0.354 -0.108 -0.375
(1.87) (-2.67) (0.04) (0.36) (0.99) (0.87) (2.52) (-0.24) (-1.49)
Cons 1.850 0.829 -0.107 0.104 0.795 -0.024 0.189 -2.141 2.114
(3.41) (1.06) (-0.36) (0.18) (0.77) (-0.04) (0.40) (-3.57) (3.87)
N 15519 7306 17365 2621 3077 5799 5760 5350 5075
R2 − within 0.496 0.571 0.679 0.829 0.641 0.629 0.711 0.743 0.674
R2 − between 0.723 0.762 0.771 0.856 0.775 0.807 0.792 0.893 0.638
R2 − overall 0.641 0.647 0.731 0.854 0.711 0.716 0.750 0.791 0.720
F 112.26 209.75 405.56 521.81 77.15 141.58 129.62 203.44 175.11
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Table 4: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corporation
fixed effects. Linear average multimarket contact control. Market definition: molecule
(Robust Standard Errors by Corporation Clusters)
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 -0.066 -0.308 -0.218 -0.242 -0.320 -0.164 -0.185 -0.190 -0.161
(-1.35) (-4.64) (-7.11) (-3.55) (-6.62) (-3.75) (-4.60) (-4.08) (-3.43)
Fsizet−1 0.240 0.292 0.221 0.114 0.214 0.171 0.162 0.318 0.160
(15.32) (11.17) (15.13) (5.02) (11.42) (8.65) (8.00) (13.35) (7.54)
Molaget -0.434 -0.210 -0.153 -0.114 -0.234 -0.203 -0.136 -0.102 -0.326
(-6.72) (-2.41) (-4.16) (-1.80) (-2.21) (-2.93) (-2.48) (-1.48) (-4.76)
Censormolt -0.010 0.016 0.118 0.080 -0.394 -0.064 0.157 0.086 0.162
(-0.13) (0.17) (2.17) (0.76) (-2.07) (-0.34) (1.43) (0.37) (1.00)
Censorlagt 0.430 0.056 0.023 0.090 1.003 0.504 -0.210 -0.407 -0.093
(2.09) (0.13) (0.23) (0.82) (2.93) (2.01) (-0.69) (-0.87) (-0.31)
Generic -0.326 0.081 -0.070 -0.185 -0.741 -0.392 -0.213 -0.024 -0.391
(-3.51) (0.58) (-1.12) (-1.36) (-3.31) (-3.21) (-2.37) (-0.18) (-4.16)
Composite -0.156 -0.122 0.084 -0.047 -0.189 0.101 0.088 -0.026 -0.086
(-1.98) (-1.79) (1.93) (-0.67) (-1.63) (1.45) (1.51) (-0.25) (-1.33)
Ngenericst 0.011 -0.039 0.009 0.029 0.126 0.049 0.001 0.023 0.003
(2.06) (-2.94) (4.23) (1.95) (4.66) (5.41) (0.28) (1.19) (0.61)
Pricegt−1 0.539 0.525 0.651 0.857 0.601 0.672 0.685 0.594 0.690
(15.30) (14.23) (21.11) (29.02) (16.69) (18.86) (21.77) (21.71) (18.78)
Dpricegt−1 -1.199 -1.354 -1.566 -1.264 -1.060 -1.631 -1.142 -0.502 -0.832
(-7.98) (-8.19) (-13.80) (-1.99) (-5.67) (-7.64) (-6.63) (-1.99) (-4.09)
H˜HIt−1 0.230 -0.891 -0.123 0.173 0.408 0.198 0.389 0.188 -0.784
(1.90) (-3.80) (-1.16) (0.93) (1.94) (0.99) (3.15) (1.34) (-4.70)
Msharet−1 0.728 -0.287 0.483 0.425 0.543 0.613 0.175 0.514 -0.579
(5.65) (-1.17) (5.75) (2.25) (2.40) (3.79) (1.58) (3.41) (-4.39)
Csharet−1 0.432 -0.596 0.008 0.150 0.341 0.225 0.362 -0.102 -0.384
(1.92) (-2.27) (0.04) (0.48) (1.09) (0.79) (2.56) (-0.22) (-1.51)
AVMMCt−1 0.009 0.037 0.010 0.012 0.037 -0.007 0.035 0.004 -0.022
(0.53) (2.46) (1.55) (2.11) (2.85) (-1.22) (0.59) (0.14) (-0.34)
Cons 1.811 0.109 -0.258 0.031 0.659 0.054 0.126 -2.154 2.133
(3.38) (0.14) (-0.85) (0.05) (0.63) (0.09) (0.27) (-3.61) (3.91)
N 15519 7306 17365 2621 3077 5799 5760 5350 5075
R2 − within 0.496 0.575 0.679 0.829 0.642 0.629 0.711 0.743 0.674
R2 − between 0.722 0.745 0.769 0.856 0.774 0.808 0.791 0.892 0.639
R2 − overall 0.639 0.627 0.729 0.855 0.708 0.717 0.750 0.790 0.720
F 106.10 218.85 397.00 472.81 90.25 133.56 129.36 197.89 166.66
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Table 5: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corpora-
tion fixed effects. The effect of the MMC depends on concentration. Market definition:
molecule (Robust Standard Errors by Corporation Clusters)
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 -0.063 -0.275 -0.221 -0.250 -0.318 -0.154 -0.186 -0.190 -0.153
(-1.30) (-4.50) (-7.38) (-3.73) (-6.72) (-3.36) (-4.65) (-4.05) (-3.39)
Fsizet−1 0.241 0.298 0.222 0.116 0.214 0.171 0.162 0.318 0.160
(15.46) (11.44) (15.52) (5.17) (11.46) (8.70) (8.02) (13.34) (7.63)
Molaget -0.414 -0.155 -0.148 -0.113 -0.233 -0.182 -0.137 -0.102 -0.322
(-6.28) (-1.92) (-4.04) (-1.79) (-2.24) (-2.58) (-2.47) (-1.51) (-4.71)
Censormolt -0.011 -0.056 0.132 0.080 -0.377 -0.084 0.158 0.084 0.174
(-0.15) (-0.56) (2.38) (0.74) (-1.91) (-0.46) (1.45) (0.36) (1.10)
Censorlagt 0.424 0.037 0.010 0.085 0.989 0.503 -0.210 -0.405 -0.107
(2.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.76) (2.90) (2.05) (-0.69) (-0.87) (-0.36)
Generic -0.334 0.070 -0.080 -0.181 -0.742 -0.393 -0.211 -0.024 -0.396
(-3.62) (0.50) (-1.30) (-1.32) (-3.30) (-3.15) (-2.36) (-0.18) (-4.14)
Composite -0.158 -0.122 0.080 -0.052 -0.189 0.090 0.089 -0.026 -0.091
(-2.00) (-1.89) (1.85) (-0.74) (-1.63) (1.32) (1.53) (-0.25) (-1.42)
Ngenericst 0.011 -0.025 0.010 0.029 0.127 0.048 0.002 0.023 0.001
(2.04) (-2.07) (4.69) (2.00) (4.84) (5.56) (0.34) (1.19) (0.28)
Pricegt−1 0.538 0.520 0.649 0.855 0.602 0.668 0.684 0.594 0.692
(15.28) (14.45) (21.40) (29.28) (16.65) (18.70) (21.77) (21.80) (18.99)
Dpricegt−1 -1.217 -1.401 -1.576 -1.253 -1.062 -1.637 -1.139 -0.502 -0.840
(-8.08) (-8.47) (-13.95) (-1.99) (-5.66) (-7.67) (-6.62) (-1.99) (-4.20)
H˜HIt−1 0.405 -0.155 0.036 0.436 0.475 0.519 0.355 0.184 -0.640
(2.83) (-0.55) (0.26) (1.24) (1.81) (2.13) (2.41) (0.92) (-3.10)
Msharet−1 0.868 0.285 0.574 0.573 0.593 0.813 0.154 0.512 -0.496
(6.01) (1.05) (6.60) (2.28) (2.58) (4.35) (1.25) (3.02) (-3.63)
Csharet−1 0.561 -0.046 0.085 0.294 0.392 0.426 0.338 -0.105 -0.302
(2.40) (-0.16) (0.41) (0.79) (1.18) (1.48) (2.24) (-0.22) (-1.17)
AVMMCt−1 0.066 0.134 0.028 0.030 0.068 0.031 -0.022 0.002 0.119
(2.43) (5.39) (2.91) (1.87) (1.02) (3.02) (-0.28) (0.04) (1.02)
AVMMCt−1* -0.092 -0.173 -0.030 -0.027 -0.043 -0.090 0.111 0.003 -0.293
HHIt−1 (-2.96) (-6.33) (-3.71) (-1.46) (-0.44) (-4.13) (0.78) (0.04) (-0.99)
Cons 1.527 -0.864 -0.377 -0.139 0.600 -0.287 0.155 -2.149 2.033
(2.75) (-1.21) (-1.18) (-0.23) (0.62) (-0.44) (0.32) (-3.61) (3.66)
N 15519 7306 17365 2621 3077 5799 5760 5350 5075
R2 − within 0.497 0.583 0.680 0.830 0.642 0.631 0.711 0.743 0.675
R2 − between 0.720 0.751 0.768 0.858 0.772 0.808 0.792 0.892 0.635
R2 − overall 0.637 0.629 0.727 0.855 0.708 0.718 0.750 0.790 0.719
F 109.94 245.26 399.39 740.76 85.01 128.95 127.20 197.11 160.83
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Table 6: Regression results for the pooled sample. Independent variable Log (Pricet).
Corporation × Country fixed effects. Market definition: Molecule (Robust Standard
Errors by Country/Corporation Cluster)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fsizet−1 0.223 0.224 0.225 0.223 0.224 0.224
(28.99) (29.10) (29.28) (28.97) (29.05) (29.20)
Newt−1 -0.184 -0.182 -0.182 -0.185 -0.184 -0.184
(-9.65) (-9.59) (-9.65) (-9.66) (-9.69) (-9.75)
Molaget -0.230 -0.220 -0.213 -0.231 -0.225 -0.219
(-9.54) (-9.26) (-8.96) (-9.55) (-9.43) (-9.16)
Censormolt 0.012 0.016 0.023 0.008 0.012 0.019
(0.28) (0.38) (0.54) (0.18) (0.28) (0.44)
Censorlagt 0.195 0.197 0.177 0.198 0.203 0.183
(2.65) (2.68) (2.41) (2.69) (2.75) (2.48)
Generic -0.203 -0.213 -0.220 -0.203 -0.210 -0.215
(-4.56) (-4.87) (-5.01) (-4.57) (-4.79) (-4.94)
Composite -0.044 -0.045 -0.047 -0.047 -0.047 -0.049
(-1.52) (-1.56) (-1.60) (-1.61) (-1.62) (-1.68)
Ngenericst 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.006
(3.65) (3.89) (4.21) (2.41) (2.50) (2.60)
Pricegt−1 0.621 0.621 0.619 0.621 0.620 0.618
(44.01) (44.05) (44.09) (44.02) (43.92) (43.86)
Dpricegt−1 -1.214 -1.211 -1.223 -1.216 -1.212 -1.225
(-17.9) (-17.9) (-18.1) (-18.0) (-17.9) (-18.1)
H˜HIt−1 -0.045 -0.031 0.123 -0.031 -0.022 0.150
(-0.78) (-0.53) (1.88) (-0.53) (-0.38) (2.25)
Msharet−1 0.312 0.340 0.442 0.324 0.342 0.453
(5.53) (6.03) (7.45) (5.62) (5.93) (7.45)
Csharet−1 0.108 0.127 0.222 0.119 0.129 0.235
(1.13) (1.34) (2.31) (1.25) (1.35) (2.41)
AVMMCt−1 0.014 0.043 0.016 0.048
(2.62) (5.07) (2.58) (4.73)
AVMMCt−1 *HHIt−1 -0.051 -0.055
(-5.96) (-5.64)
Dregt*Ngenericst 0.010 0.012 0.014
(2.39) (2.91) (3.30)
Dregt*AVMMCt−1 -0.026 -0.030
(-2.75) (-2.25)
Dregt*AVMMCt−1 *HHIt−1 -0.013
(-0.71)
Cons 0.416 0.300 0.151 0.420 0.340 0.185
(2.01) (1.45) (0.72) (2.03) (1.66) (0.89)
N 67872 67872 67872 67872 67872 67872
R2 − within 0.616 0.616 0.617 0.616 0.617 0.618
R2 − between 0.733 0.731 0.730 0.733 0.732 0.731
R2 − overall 0.685 0.682 0.680 0.686 0.684 0.682
F 751.73 729.21 757.71 721.92 670.53 677.35
